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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1992), as a final order of a court 
of record over which the Utah Court of Appeals did not have original 
jurisdiction. 
The clerk of the Utah Supreme Court gave notice that this 
appeal had been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah 
Supreme Court has discretion to make such transfer under Rule 42, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it 
granted Robert M. Mills and Donna H. Mills summary judgement without 
considering disputes of material facts contained in the parties 
affidavits. 
The standard of appellate review for this issue is 
correctness, without deference to the trial court's legal 
determinations. It is well-established that appellate courts in 
Utah give no deference to the trial court's fact findings and 
conclusions of law in a summary judgement proceeding. Canfield v. 
Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224, 1224-25 (Utah App. 1992). 
Additionally, the evidence must be considered in a light most 
favorable to the losing party in a summary judgement proceeding. 
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We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and affirm only where it appears there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact, or where, 
even according to the facts as contended by the losing party, 
the moving party is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. 
Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 
1979) . 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in 
interpreting an unclear, incomplete and ambiguous contract in a 
summary judgement proceeding. 
The standard of appellate review for this issue is 
correctness, without deference to the trial court's legal 
determinations. It is well-established that appellate courts in 
Utah give no deference to the trial court's fact findings and 
conclusions of law in a summary judgement proceeding. Canfield v. 
Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224, 1224-25 (Utah App. 1992). 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error in failing to 
recognize that equitable estoppel and part performance are valid 
defenses to the statute of frauds in Utah. 
The standard of appellate review for this issue is 
correctness, without deference to the trial court's legal 
determinations. It is well-established that appellate courts in 
Utah give no deference to the trial court' s fact findings and 
conclusions of law in a summary judgement proceeding. Canfield v. 
Albertsonsr 841 P.2d 1224, 1224-25 (Utah App. 1992). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
None. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On March 16, 1995, Appellees Robert M. and Donna H. Mills 
("Appellees") filed a Complaint against Appellant Jana Jean Brody 
for unlawful detainer. The Complaint alleged that Appellant failed 
to vacate the premises of the condominium at issue in this case. 
On April 5, 1995, Appellant filed an Answer and Counterclaim and 
subsequent Amended Counterclaim alleging that Appellees' refusal to 
sell the condominium constituted a breach of the option to purchase 
contract that the parties had signed on February 3, 1993. The 
claims asserted by both parties in this case arose out of a lease 
agreement and option to purchase contract which the parties signed 
on February 3, 1993. * 
On July 26, 1995, Judge Homer F. Wilkinson granted Appellees' 
Motion for Summary Judgement after finding that Appellant violated 
the terms of the lease agreement by failing to vacate the premises 
and that Appellant did not timely exercise the option to purchase 
because the contract required payment of the entire purchase price 
within the option period. The trial court ordered Appellant to 
vacate the premises before August 1, 1995 and to pay a total 
judgement of $21,416.00, which consisted of rental fees, treble 
1The only evidence presented at the hearing for Appellees' 
Motion for Summary Judgment was the lease and option to purchase 
and the parties' affidavits. 
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damages, court costs and attorney's fees. This appeal was timely 
filed on August 16, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Appellant, Jana Jean Brody, signed a valid and enforceable 
lease with an option to purchase Appellees', Robert M. and Donna H. 
Mills, condominium on or about February 3rd, 1993. A copy of the 
lease and option to purchase are attached as Exhibit #1. Under the 
terms of the option to purchase, Appellant had a twenty-four month 
option to purchase Appellees' condominium located at 1593 East 6430 
South, Holladay, Utah ("condominium"). 
There is no clause in the option to purchase which required 
full payment at the time of acceptance. Additionally, there was 
no oral agreement between the parties that required payment in full 
at the time of acceptance. The option to purchase was exercised by 
Appellant's husband, Pat Brody, both by a telephone conversation 
which took place on February 9, 1995 and a written correspondence 
dated February 10, 1995, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit #2. 
In the letter, Appellant's husband informed Appellees that they 
were prepared to close the transaction at any time. Appellees 
informed Appellant that they would not return to Salt Lake City, 
Utah, from a two-year mission for their church until mid-March and 
would prefer to "close" at that time. See Affidavit of Pat Brody 
15 7-10, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit # 3 
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Appellant and Appellees subsequently agreed to close between 
March 20 and March 24, 1995. See Affidavit of Pat Brody II 8 & 
9. Merrill Title Company of Midvale, Utah was notified of the 
closing date and a file was opened to complete the transaction 
between the parties. See Affidavit of Pat Brody I 11. Appellees 
have refused to perform the option to purchase contract. See Pat 
Brody's Affidavit I 12. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial Court erred by granting summary judgement in a 
case where the affidavits and pleadings clearly show that genuine 
issues of material facts exist. The affidavits reveal several 
genuine issues of material facts, including whether the option to 
purchase was modified and extended for Appellees' convenience, 
whether the option to purchase required payment in full by February 
15, 1995, and whether the option to purchase was properly exercised 
when Appellant contacted Appellees before the original expiration 
of the option. Additionally, the trial court erred by interpreting 
an incomplete and ambiguous contract at the summary judgement stage. 
The option to purchase did not state whether the entire purchase 
price had to be rendered to exercise the option. Further, the 
option did not include a integrated clause and Appellees presented 
no evidence that the option was intended to be an integrated and 
complete contract. The trial court also committed manifest error 
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when it failed to recognize equitable estoppel and part performance 
as defenses to the statute of frauds under Utah law, 
ARGUMENT 
I. IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED UNDER UTAH LAW THAT IT IS AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGEMENT UNLESS THERE ARE NO 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT, 
The trial court committed manifest error when it granted 
summary judgement despite there being several disputed issues of 
material facts. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
clear that summary judgement is improper when issues of material 
fact exist. 
The judgement sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
Pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Utah R. of Civ. P. 56(c). See also Young v. Felorniaf 244 P. 2d 862 
(Utah 1952) (stating that under Rule 56(c) it is clear that if there 
is any genuine issue as to any material fact, the motion should be 
denied). 
In the present case, Appellant's husband, Pat Brody, and 
Appellee, Robert Mills, filed Affidavits with their memorandum in 
connection with the summary judgement proceeding. A copy of the 
Affidavit of Robert Mills is attached as Exhibit #5. The Affidavits 
and pleading reveal at least the following genuine issues of 
material fact: 
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1. Whether the option to purchase was modified and extended 
to the week of March 21, 1995, for Appellees' convenience. 
2. Whether the option to purchase, by its terms or by oral 
agreement, required payment in full before February 15, 1995. 
3. Whether the option to purchase was properly exercised 
when Appellant contacted Appellees by telephone and in writing 
before the original expiration of the option. 
4. Whether Appellees acknowledged that Appellant had 
exercised the option to purchase in the phone conversation which 
took place on February 9, 1995. 
5. Whether Appellees told Appellant in that same phone 
conversation that immediate payment was not necessary and that they 
could "close" when they returned from their mission after the 
original expiration. 
All reasonably disputed issues of material fact must be 
construed in favor of the party being moved against, as well as all 
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from factual statements 
such as those put forth by Appellant's Affidavit. W.M. Barnes Co. 
v. Sohio National Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah 1981). 
Additionally, it is not in the judge's discretion at the summary 
judgement stage to weigh the credibility of the parties or the 
evidence. Id. 
The Affidavits in this case contain disputed facts that 
preclude summary judgement because the facts are material to the 
outcome of the case. For example, the trial court ruled that 
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Appellant did not timely exercise the option when there is ambiguity 
as to the facts and intentions of the parties on this issue. 
When the facts alleged by Appellant's Affidavit are construed 
in her favor, it is clear that Appellees were not entitled to 
judgement as a matter of law and summary judgement was improper in 
this case. The trial court's judgement was therefore manifest error 
and Appellant prays the Court to remand the case for a proper 
determination on the merits. 
II. A TRIAL COURT MAY ONLY INTERPRET A CONTRACT ON A MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT WHEN IT IS COMPLETE, CLEAR, AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 
The trial court committed manifest error in interpreting an 
ambiguous contract instead of allowing it to go to a jury for 
interpretation. The trial court should have allowed the case to 
proceed to trial to determine whether there was any extrinsic 
evidence to clear up the ambiguities in the option to purchase. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has made the following statement 
about a trial court's discretion in interpreting contracts at the 
summary judgement stage: 
Only when contract terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous 
can they be interpreted by the judge on a motion for summary 
judgement . . . . If the evidence as to the terms of an 
agreement is in conflict, the intent of the parties as to the 
terms of the agreement is to be determined by the jury. 
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 
1986) (citing Morris v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. , 
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658 P.2d 1199, 1201 (Utah 1983); Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design 
Associates, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981)). 
The option to purchase was unclear, ambiguous and incomplete 
as to whether the entire purchase price had to be rendered to 
exercise the option. The option also does not include an 
integration clause and Appellees presented no evidence that the 
option was intended to be an integrated and complete contract. 
An unintegrated contract may exist where the terms are not 
ambiguous, but the nature of the agreement itself is unclear. Id. 
Extrinsic evidence should be allowed to determine if the option is 
a clear and comprehensive integration of the parties' intent. 
The trial court committed manifest error when it ruled the 
entire purchase price was required before the original option 
period expired where the contract is unclear, ambiguous and 
incomplete. The Appellant respectfully asks the Court to remand 
the case for proper factual determinations on these issues. 
III. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND PART PERFORMANCE ARE VALID DEFENSE TO 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN UTAH. 
The trial court also committed manifest error in failing to 
recognize that equitable estoppel and part performance are valid 
defenses to the statute of frauds in Utah. The Supreme Court of 
Utah first recognized the defense of equitable estoppel in a 1970 
case where the exercise of an option contract was similarly at 
issue. 
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An option to purchase is an interest in real estate and is 
within the statute of frauds. An extension of a contract 
which is required to be in writing is not enforceable, by the 
majority rule, in the absence of an estoppelf if it does not 
comply with the statute of frauds. 
Coombs v. Ouzounian, 465 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1970) (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court of Utah has defined equitable estoppel as 
follows: 
Estoppel is an equitable defense that requires proof of three 
elements: (i) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by 
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) 
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or not 
taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, 
act, or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party 
that would result from allowing the first party to contradict 
or repudiate such statement, admission, act or failure to act. 
Ceco v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 
1989)(citing Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 
602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979)). 
Each of the elements of equitable estoppel were alleged by 
Appellant's Affidavit in this case. Specifically, Appellees sought 
to modify and extend the option to purchase for their own 
convenience. When Appellant's husband informed Appellees of their 
acceptance of the option to purchase, Appellees told him that it 
would be more convenient to close the transaction when they returned 
to Salt Lake the third week of March, 1995. Both parties orally 
agreed to postpone the closing date until the Appellees returned to 
Utah. 
Appellant relied on this representation by contacting a title 
and setting up a closing date of the third week of March, 1995. 
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Further, Appellant made no further attempts to close until Appellees 
returned despite the fact that they could have closed before 
February 15, 1995. Appellant's husband informed Appellees in the 
February 10, 1995 letter that they were exercising the option and 
could close "at any time." 
As a result of her reliance on Appellees' oral 
representations, Appellant was injured. She was denied the 
opportunity to purchase the property where she and her husband 
resided for two years and had always planned on purchasing. 
Appellant and her husband lost equity that had a substantial value. 
Also, in anticipation of owning the condominium, Appellant has made 
improvements to the property at a substantial cost. 
This Court recently noted that it may apply the doctrine of 
part performance to enforce, by estoppel, an oral agreement that 
would otherwise be precluded by the statute of frauds. Green v. 
Stansfield, 886 P.2d 117, 122 (Ut.App. 1994). In Allen v. Kingdom, 
723 P. 2d 394, 396-97 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court also 
recognized part performance as an exception to the statute of 
frauds; "where a party has changed position by performing an oral 
modification so that it would be inequitable to permit the other 
party to found a claim or defense on the original agreement as 
modified." 
Additionally, U.C.A. § 25-5-3 provides that nothing in the 
chapter on statute of frauds "shall be construed to abridge the 
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powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements 
in the case of part performance thereof." 
In Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 P.2d 575 (Utah App. 1993), this 
Court noted that "transactions for the sale of realty may be 
exempted from the statute of frauds where there is 'sufficient 
performance on the part of [one party] exclusively referable to 
the alleged contract to exempt it from the statute of frauds.'" Id. 
at 580 (citing Ryan v. Earl, 618 P.2d 54, 55 (Utah 1980)). 
In Holt, the appellant alleged the parties had orally agreed 
to modify their original, written real estate contract to facilitate 
defendant's sale of certain real property. The trial court granted 
summary judgement because it found no written modification existed. 
Id. at 578. The Supreme Court of Utah held that plaintiff's 
acceptance of substituted collateral and grant of permission for 
defendant to pay off an existing loan, constituted part performance 
sufficient, as a matter of law, to exempt the entire modification 
from the proscriptions of the statute of frauds. Id. at 580. The 
Court found that the trial court had committed error because there 
was conflicting evidence on the matter. Id. at 579. The case was 
remanded because, similar to the present case, there were genuine 
issues of material fact. 
In the present case, Appellant performed part of the oral 
modification and extension by contacting a title company and setting 
a closing date of the third week of March, 1995. Appellant had made 
improvements to the condominium in anticipation of purchasing the 
12 
property. Also, as stated above, Appellant did not act to close the 
transaction despite the fact that they were willing to do so before 
February 15, 1995. 
In Utah, the doctrine of part performance has not been 
confined to a fixed, inflexible formula. 
The doctrine of part performance, in the state of Utah, 
has not been reduced to a formula, as it has in some of our 
sister states. Thus, decisions of this court do not stay the 
hand of equity in the equitable situations created by oral 
contracts for the transfer of an interest in land, but the 
statute is preserved and remains to serve its purpose - the 
prevention of fraud and injustice. 
Young v. Moore, 663 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1983)(emphasis added)(citing 
Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballardf 534 P.2d 611, 613-14 (Utah 
1975)). 
This Court should remand the case for further proceedings on 
the merits to prevent fraud and injustice because Appellant 
partially performed the modification and extension. Appellees's 
failure to perform prevented Appellant from purchasing the 
condominium where she has lived and prevented her from the equity 
and improvements to which she is entitled. These equitable doctrines 
were established to prevent the type of injustice that would result 
in this case if the statute of frauds is allowed to proscribe the 
modification and extension of the option to purchase. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed manifest error when it failed to 
recognize equitable estoppel and part performance as defenses to the 
statute of frauds in Utah. The trial court also erred by granting 
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summary judgement in a case where the affidavits and pleading 
clearly show that genuine issues of material fact exist. 
Additionally, the trial court erred by interpreting an incomplete 
and ambiguous contract at the summary judgement stage. Appellant 
respectfully asks the Court to reverse the trial court's Summary 
Judgement and remand the case to be tried on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this \ day of April, 1996. 
/^^^ nn 
MATTHEW W. DR/TOJSS 
Attorney for Appel lan t 
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EXHIBIT I 
LEASE AGREEMENT 
This agreement, made and entered into, by and between Robert M. 
and Donna H. Mills, the owners, hereinafter jointly referred to 
as -LANDLORD" and . N ~ w , 7 " ^ ^ /S^X 
hereinafter jointly referred to as "TENANT". 
WITNESSETH: 
That the LANDLORD for and in consideration of the rents, covenants, 
conditions, and agreements hereinafter mentioned, reserved and 
contained on the part of the TENANT to be paid, kept and performed, 
does by these presents grant, demise, lease and let unto TENANT 
those certain premises (hereinafter "Premises") situated in the 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah and more particularly described 
as follows, to-wit: 
1593 East 6430 South 
Holladay, Utah 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD unto said TENANT from the /V^day of A<r/^ , 
1993, until the JJ±_ day of Al^r^L- \99£ YIELDING AND PAYING 
THEREFORE unto said LANDLORD the total sum of $ tt Z-< .<* , 
paying installments throughout said term in the form of monthly 
rental in advance on the _i£lfday of each and every month oi said 
term in the amount of $ (&.-<>. ^\> . 
yfi-
IN ADDITION to the rent due hereunder, prior to taking possession 
of the Premises, TENANT shall pay LANDLORD the sum of Five Hundred 
Dollars ($500.00) to be held by LANDLORD for as long as TENANT 
occupies Premises as a security deposit for the faithful perfor-
mance of TENANT'S obligations hereunder and the additional sum of 
Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) to be held by LANDLORD for as long 
as TENANT occupies Premises as partial payment of the last month's 
rent. In no event shall the LANDLORD be obliged to apply the 
security deposit upon rents or other charges in arrears or upon 
damages for the TENANT'S failure to perform these covenants, 
conditions, and agreements. The LANDLORD may so apply the security 
deposit at its option. The LANDLORD'S right to the possession of 
the leased Premises for non-payment of rents or for other reasons 
shall not, in any conditions, agreement or event be affected by 
reason of the fact that the LANDLORD holds these funds. Upon the 
expiration of this agreement, the security deposit will be returned 
to TENANT without interest when Premises are left in the condition 
it was in upon the date of first occupancy. 
1 
COVENANTS OF THE TENANT: 
Said TENANT does hereby covenant and agree with LANDLORD that it 
will: 
1). Timely pay all rental payments to LANDLORD by depositing 
payment in the bank account specified by LANDLORD. 
2). Use and occupy Premises in a careful and proper manner 
for a personal residence only, and TENANT shall not create or 
permit any nuisance or disturbance, nor commit any waste, nor shall 
it use the Premises for any unlawful purpose, and TENANT shall 
conform to and obey all present or future laws, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, requirements, and orders of governmental authority, 
condominium rules, regulations and bylaws respecting the use and 
occupancy of demised Premises. 
3). Neither assign this lease or sublet the Premises or any 
part thereof without the prior written consent of the LANDLORD. 
4). Make no alterations or additions in or to said Premises 
without the prior written consent of the LANDLORD. 
5). Maintain its own personal property and theft insurance. 
6). At a^l times during the term hereof or any renewal, 
protect, indemnify and save harmless the LANDLORD from any and all 
claims for damages for personal injury and/or property damage 
occurring on or about the Premises. 
7). Accept said Premises in its present state of repair 
except as herein otherwise specifically set forth, and TENANT shall 
be responsible for maintenance of the interior of said Premises in 
a good state of repair throughout the term of this lease. It is 
understood that, except as specifically set forth on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto, ^ the Premises includes no furnishings for use by 
the TENANT, and TENANT shall be fully responsible to furnish the 
Premises at its own expense. Personal property belonging to 
LANDLORD may be stored in a room within the Premises which shall 
remain secured at all times. 
( ^ c-f 2-^-^n) 8). Pay for electricity and natural gas 
9). Be responsible for plate glass breakage. 
10). Permit LANDLORD or LANDLORD'S agent at all reasonable 
times to enter upon said Premises for the purpose of inspection. 
12). Deliver up the Premises to the LANDLORD at the expiration 
or prior termination of this lease in as good condition as when 
received, excepting reasonable wear and tear and damage arising 
from negligence or default of the LANDLORD or its agents. 
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COVENANTS OF THE LANDLORD: 
The LANDLORD on its part covenants and agrees with TENANT that it 
will pay all standard condominium maintenance fees relating to the 
Premises which includes payment for sewer and water. 
MUTUAL COVENANTS: 
The LANDLORD and TENANT mutually covenant and agree as follows: 
1). The LANDLORD shall not be liable or accountable to said 
TENANT for any damages occurring by reason of any defect in 
utilities or fixtures or any defective condition on the Premises, 
nor be liable for any damage occasioned by the said Premises being 
out of repair, nor for any damage done or occasioned by or from 
plumbing, gas, water, steam or other pipes or sewage, or the 
bursting, leaking or running of any closet or plumbing or other 
damage by water, ifi, above, upon or about said Premises, nor any 
damage arising from any act or neglect of any co-tenant or other 
occupants of the same condominium project, or of any owners or 
occupants of adjoining or contiguous property. 
2). The LANDLORD shall not be liable and the TENANT hereby 
waives all claims for damage that may be caused by the LANDLORD in 
re-entering and taking possession of the Premises as herein pro-
vided, and all claims for damages that may result from the des-
truction of or injury to the Premises or building. 
3). Any holding over after the expiration of the term of this 
lease or any extension thereof, with the prior written permission 
of LANDLORD, shall be construed as unlawful detainer and LANDLORD 
may exercise such rights as are available to it at that time. 
4). If the TENANT shall at any time be in default in payment 
of rent herein reserved, or in the performance of any of the 
covenants, terms, conditions or provisions of this lease, and the 
TENANT shall fail to remedy such default within ten days after 
written notice thereof from LANDLORD, or if TENANT should make an 
assignment for the^ benefit of creditors, or have a petition in 
bankruptcy filed against it, or file a petition in bankruptcy, or 
if a receiver of any property of TENANT on or about the said 
premises be appointed, it shall be lawful for LANDLORD to im-
mediately terminate this lease and said lease shall not be 
assignable in any process of law nor be treated as an asset of said 
TENANT nor shall it pass to the control of any trustee or assignee 
of TENANT by virtue of any action or proceedings. LANDLORD may in 
such case, at its option, terminate this lease and re-enter upon 
said Premises and repossess and enjoy same as in its first and 
former estate and thereupon this lease and everything therein 
contained on the part of the LANDLORD to be done and performed 
shall cease and determine, without prejudice to the rights of the 
LANDLORD to recover from TENANT all rent due up to the time of such 
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entry. In case of any such default and entry by the LANDLORD, 
LANDLORD may relet said Premises for the remainder of said term for 
the highest rent obtainable and may recover from TENANT any 
deficiency between the amount so obtained and the rent herein 
reserved. 
5). All improvements to the property made by TENANT shall 
become and remain the property of the LANDLORD at the expiration or 
prior termination of this lease. 
6). No furniture of TENANT located on the Premises shall be 
removed from the Premises unless obligations of TENANT to LANDLORD 
hereunder are current, and TENANT hereby grants to LANDLORD a lien 
upon such furniture to assure faithful performance by TENANT of the 
terms, conditions and covenants of this lease. 
7). Should either party hereto or its successors default in 
the performance of the covenants, conditions, term or agreements 
herein contained, that party shall be liable for all costs and 
expenses that may arise from enforcing this agreement, or any right 
or remedy arising out of the breach thereof, including costs and a 
reasonable attorney's fee, regardless of whether or not suit be 
instituted. 
8). This lease and all of the covenants, provisions and 
conditions herein contained shall inure to the benefit of and be 
binding upon the successors and assigns of the LANDLORD and TENANT 
of this agreement. 
9). The words "LANDLORD" and "TENANT", as used herein, in-
clude, apply to, and bind and benefit the heirs, executors, 
personal representatives, administrators, successors and assigns of 
the LANDLORD and TENANT. 
10). No waiver of the right to forfeiture of this lease or re-
entry upon breach of any of the conditions thereof shall be deemed 
a waiver of such right upon any subsequent breach of such or any 
other condition. 
11). TjLme is of the essence in this lease and every term, 
covenant, and condition herein contained. 
12). Past Due Rent Charges. If TENANT shall fail to pay 
within ten (10) days after due and payable any rent or any other 
amounts or charges for which it is responsible to LANDLORD, TENANT 
shall pay a late fee equal to four (4%) percent of such past due 
amount, and in addition, TENANT shall pay interest from the due 
date of such past due amount to the date of payment both before and 
after Judgment at a rate equal to the greater of eighteen (18%) 
percent per annum or four (4%) percent over "prime rate" charged by 
Zion's First National Bank of Utah at the due date of such payment; 
provided, however, that in any case the maximum amount or rate of 
interest to be charged shall not exceed the maximum non-usurious 
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rate in accordance with applicable law. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said parties have hereunto set their hands and 
seals on this 9 ^ day of rV/y/u/ci/., , 1993. 
LANDLORD: 
Robert M. Mills 
Donna H. Mills 
TENANT: 
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ADDENDUM A 
OPTION TO PURCHASE 
"Purchaser" shall retain for a period of twenty four months, 
commencing February 15th, 1993, an option to purchase the real 
property located at 1593 East 6430 South, Holladay, Utah, for the 
sum of One Hundred Fifty Five Thousand and no/100 ($155,000.) 
Payments made during the term of the lease /hall be applied, in the 
event that the purchase is completed, $7^ hr00 towards the principal 
and $jr, 0-25 towards , interest, taxes, insurance, and association 
This addendum is hereby incorporated in to and made an integral 
part of the attached lease agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, saixl parties have hereunto set their hands and 
seals on this ^ ^ < day of -y^ld^/y" r 1993. 
^ ^  
~?/%/^ ^ Owher/RoHert Mi Mxlls 
Owner/Donna H. Mills 
Purchaser 
Tab 2 
EXKlCiT 2L 
Febiuaiy 10, 1995 
Robert and Donna Mills 
Route One 
Box 305 
South Royaiton, Vermont 
U5038 
Dear Mr and Mrs. Miiis. 
I hope you enjoyed your mission, and I trust that you wiii have a pleasant tour of the country on 
your way back to Sait Lake. Have you decided wheie you're going to caii home' 
I just wanted to iet you know that we wiii be exceicismg our option to puiciia^e me 
condominium You had mentioned an attorney mat wouici assist m the closing, etc L apoiagize, 
i iiave iost that information If you or he couio caii me at 277-20 iO (jiome oirice; or 2o6-3 i 17 
(regular business hours) and advise if you have a piererence of title companies, closing dates, 
etc i would appreciate it it wouid probably be a good idea to spend some time on the phone 
( n » \ . « • » \ _ « A i . \ . W * « . I U V L / V U H V l « t U t J \J X-. ^IkSS U l l U l l V U l t \.«^r• M . l i . V l i » \ . < »_ I w l U l i ^ J- V« ^J >^1 \J l \ . l » % . %.!!.._ t v t l i ^ v J. M i l l 
available at your iiesure for this; an evening would be ideal, (if you caii mi* mun>day thiough 
Saturday, we wiii be in Park City at 801 645 8496 ; 
In terms of the purchase, we can do this anywhere from now to the time mat vou get back to 
town piease iet me know what best suits youi needs (i e ,since you re ietui ning on March 23rd, 
if vou would like the closing to coincide with that Gate, that is line with me in this case we 
wouid pro rate an additional three weeks of the iease if you would like to wrap mat pait up 
immediately, that is 0 K to, and i wouid be happy to assist with naving youi wateiueci, liidge, and 
other furniture moved to a storage unit for a montn ox so ) 
Jana and i have appreciated living here and nope mat you enjoy youi new Pome, v ncrevci mat 
might be1 
1 iook foiward to talking to vou soon, 
5inceieiy, 
AiiM/ 
Tab 3 
EXHIBIT ^L~ 
MATTHEW W. DRIGGS #6085 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
Attorney for Defendant/Counterclaimant 
1300 Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2093 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT M. 
MILLS, 
vs. 
JANA JEAN 
JANA JEAN 
vs. 
ROBERT M. 
MILLS, 
MILLS and DONNA H. 
Plaintiffs, 
BRODY, 
Defendant. 
BRODY, 
Counterclaimant, 
MILLS and DONNA H. : 
Counterdefendants. : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF PAT BRODY 
: Civil No. 950901852CV 
: Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
PAT BRODY, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I am of legal age and am competent to testify in this 
matter. 
2. I have personal knowledge that the facts stated herein 
are true and correct. 
3. I am married to the defendant, Jana Jean Brody. 
4. On or about the 3rd day of February, 1993, my wife 
entered into a lease agreement with the plaintiffs herein. At the 
time said lease agreement was signed, an option to purchase the 
condominium was extended and consideration was paid for the option 
to purchase the condominium. 
5. Prior to the signing of the lease agreement with an 
option to purchase, there was a very clear understanding between 
the parties that plaintiffs, at all relevant times, intended to 
sell the condominium and not return to the condominium after their 
mission. 
6. In July of 1994, my wife and I considered exercising the 
option and, in fact, we contacted the plaintiffs with regard 
thereto. At that time, we indicated to plaintiffs that we would 
either purchase the property or, in the alternative, we would 
purchase the property and sell it out of escrow to an interested 
third party. It was anticipated that this would be accomplished 
prior to the 15th day of February, 1995. 
7. On or about the 9th day of February, 1995, my wife and I 
decided to exercise the option to purchase the condominium. On or 
about the 9th day of February, 1995, acting on behalf of my wife 
and with her express authority, I had a telephone conversation with 
Mr. Robert M. Mills. During said telephone conversation, an 
unconditional acceptance of the offer to purchase the condominium 
for the term stated in the option agreement was given. At that 
time, I stated that my wife and I could close the transaction at 
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any time. Mr. Mills acknowledged the acceptance, and a bilateral 
contract was formed regarding the sale of the property. 
8. During said telephone conversation, Mr. Mills stated that 
he would not be in town because of his mission, and he asked that 
the closing on the sale of the property be delayed until he 
returned to Salt Lake City, Utah. I agreed with Mr. Mills to close 
the sale of the condominium on or about the 21st day of March, 
1995, when the plaintiffs would be in town. An agreement was 
reached as to the closing. I then reguested Mr. Mills to inform me 
as to his preference of title company, closing venue, etc. 
9. At the time of said telephone conversation, there was no 
misunderstanding that the option had been exercised to purchase the 
condominium and that the closing of the sale of the condominium 
would take place on or about the week of the 21st day of March, 
1995. 
10. After the telephone conversation, I acknowledged in 
writing the telephone conversation, which was sent via overnight 
priority Federal Express mail on or about the 12th day of February, 
1995. 
11. ^t some point thereafter, I contacted a title company and 
arranged for said title company to begin the closing procedures so 
that the closing could take place. Relying upon the representation 
that plaintiffs made on the 9th day of February, 1995, I contacted 
the real estate agent in connection with the sale of the 
condominium and informed him to proceed toward closing on or about 
the 21st day of March, 1995. I also began making other 
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preparations to purchase the condominium as set forth in the 
telephone call and the letter. 
12. At some point, plaintiffs decided that they would not 
sell the property and informed me that they would not comply with 
the agreement as set forth in the option and the telephone 
conversation of the 9th day of February, 1995. 
13. At all times, I believe that I properly exercised the 
option to purchase the condominium on behalf of my .wife. We 
accepted the outstanding offer prior to the expiration of the 
option. At the time of the telephone conversation and the 
subseguent letter, my wife and I had the ability to perform under 
the option agreement. At all times since the exercising of the 
option, we have desired to purchase the condominium and paid 
consideration for the option to do so. The only reason that funds 
were not tendered prior to the 15th day of February, 1995 is 
because of the request of the plaintiffs, who would not be in town 
to close the transaction. 
14. Since the 9th day of February, 1995, my wife and I have 
been ready and willing to proceed with the purchase of the 
condominium. 
DATED this "?L)T— day of May, 1995. 
ff2 / /%Jy 
PATlfeRODY y / 
On this "2C/Z2 day of May, 1995, personally appeared before me 
PAT BRODY, who duly acknowledged to me that he signed the foregoing 
4 
Affidavit, and he stated that he has read the same and knows the 
contents thereof to be true and correct. 
My commission expires: / ^ £y //""V^ i 
Notary Public // / 
Residing at Sa±t Lake County, Utah 
r """ NOTAR7PU3LJC""" I 
S
 /££$& MATTHEW W DRIGGS • 
| /$$£>!& 7050 SOUTH UNION PARK AVE #420 I 
\*S**ll7 MDVALE.UT 84047 • 
| N 5 J ^ My Commission Expires May 11,1997 I 
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Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178 j ! 3 n ? * H ^ S S 
STOKER & SWINTON I ** *» ^ ^ * - * » - * * * 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
311 South State Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-4000 
FltE0H«TR!GTCrJ!!T 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 2 6 1995 
By. n bAUrt LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Ctork 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT M. 
MILLS, 
vs . 
JANA JEAN 
JANA JEAN 
vs . 
ROBERT M. 
MILLS, 
MILLS and DONNA H. 
Plaintiffs, 
BRODY, 
Defendant. 
BRODY, : 
Counterclaimant, : 
MILLS and DONNA H. : 
Counterdefendants. : 
: SUMMARY JUDGMENT" / '*'V) 
: Case No.950901852 CV - N— ' 
j 
: Judge Homer F. Wilkinson/' 
IU 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment came on for Hearing on 
the 17th day of July, 1995. Plaintiffs were represented by Jeffrey 
C. Swinton of the law firm of Stoker & Swinton, and Defendant, Jana 
Jean Brody, was represented by Matthew W. Driggs of the law firm of 
Armstrong, Rawlings & West. 
The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and read the 
Memoranda of the parties, HEREBY FINDS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. In June of 1994, the Brodys notified the Mills of their 
intent to exercise their Option. 
2. In response thereto, the Mills granted a limited power 
1 
of attorney to their attorney, Jeffrey C. Swinton, to close the 
transaction. 
3. The Mills then notified the Brodys in a letter dated June 
14, 1994, that Mr. Swinton had been appointed their attorney to 
close the transaction on their behalf. 
4. The Brodys were unable to perform on their own and in 
desperation, listed the property for sale. 
5. The Option to Purchase was drafted by Pat Brody, husband 
to Defendant, Jana Jean Brody, and in the case of ambiguity will be 
interpreted against the Brodys. 
6. The Option required payment of the entire purchase price 
within the Option period. 
7. The Brodys did not timely exercise the Option. 
8. The Brodys are without clean hands, having never tendered 
payment of the purchase price before the expiration of the Option 
period or any rental payments directly to the Mills or into escrow 
after March 15, 1995. 
9. The Lease has expired and the Brodys have unlawfully held 
over possession. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Brodys shall vacate the condominium before August 1, 
1995. 
2. In the event the Brodys fail to vacate on or before that 
date, they may be evicted. 
3. If there is any waste to the condominium as a result of 
this Order, there will be an additional element of damages awarded 
2 
in favor of the Mills. 
4. The Brodys are to pay the Mills rent at the rate of 
$1,150.00 per month from the 15th day of March, 1995, until the 
31st day of July when the condominium is to be vacated and those 
rents shall be trebled under the law. The Judgment for rental 
damages therefore, is for 4 1/2 months rent in the total amount of 
$5,175.00, with such damages trebled in accordance with the law, to 
total $15,525.00. A supplemental award of damages shall- be granted 
should the Brodys remain in occupancy beyond July 31, 1995. 
5. Plaintiffs are entitled to a further judgment against 
Defendant for their attorney's fees in the amount of $5,508.50 and 
Court costs in the amount of $382.50. 
6. Any security deposit held by the Mills shall be refunded 
to or deducted from the judgment at the time of payment. 
THEREFORE, a total judgment is hereby rendered in favor of 
Plaintiffs and against Defendant, Jana Jean Brody, in the amount of 
$21,416.00 with interest accruing thereon from the date of judgment 
until paid in full at the statutory rate of 9.22% per annum. It is 
further ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount 
of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in enforcing the 
provisions of the judgment and in collecting said judgment by 
execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED this Ji ' day of July, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
/Homer F . W i l k i n s o n , D i s t r i c t Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g 
Summary Judgment was TRANSMITTED VIA FACSIMILE, t h i s _ J T ~ o f J u l y , 
1995 , t o t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
Matthew W. Dr iggs 
A r m s t r o n g , Rawlings and West 
1300 Walker C e n t e r 
175 Sou th Main S t r e e t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
F a c s i m i l e # 359-2125 
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Jeffrey C. Swinton #3178 
STOKER & SWINTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
311 South State Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)359-4 000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT M. MILLS and DONNA H. 
MILLS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
JANA JEAN BRODY, 
Defendant. 
JANA JEAN BRODY, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs . 
ROBERT M. MILLS and DONNA H. 
MILLS, 
Counterdefendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNT OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW Robert M. Mills, a Plaintiff in the above entitled 
action, being duly sworn, states as follows: 
1. I am Robert M. Mills, a Plaintiff in the above entitled 
action. 
2. On the third day of February 1993 my wife and I leased our 
condominium to Defendant, Jana Jean Brody, until the first day of 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. MILLS 
Case No. 950901852 CV 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
March, 1995, when we planned to return home from a mission for our 
church and reToccupy our condominium. 
3. Jana Jean Brody's husband, Pat Brody refused to allow his 
wife to sign the Lease without an Option to Purchase being m^de a 
part thereof. Therefore, Mr. Brody drafted and attached a on^ oige 
4. We specifically set the date for exercise of the op^on io 
be February 15, 1995, knowing that my wife and I would need cash in 
hand to find a new home immediately upon our arrival. 
5 . It was always our understanding of the option to purchase 
drafted by Mr. Brody that payment of $155,000.00 in cash less any 
credit given for any rental payments made would be received in our 
hands no later than February 15, 1995. 
6. Sometime before June 14, 1994, Pat Brody contacted me by 
telephone and told me he desired to exercise the option to purchase 
the condominium being leased by his wife. 
7. On or about the 9th day of June of 1994 my wife and I 
signed a power of attorney appointing Jeffrey C. Swinton as our 
attorney-in-fact to "sign and otherwise execute any and all legal 
documents relative to the sale of our condominium located at 159 3 
East 6430 South, in Holladay, Utah". A copy of that Power of 
Attorney is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "A". 
8. On the 14th day of June of 1994 I sent a letter to Mr. and 
Mrs. Pat Brody telling them that I had engaged Mr. Swinton to 
represent us in the transaction and that he had been given a 
limited power of attorney to close the sale in our absence. A copy 
of that letter is attached to the Memorandum filed with this 
affidavit. 
9. No further contact was made by Mr. Brody with me or my 
attorney until December of 1994 when Mr. Brody contacted me once 
again and indicated his desire to purchase the condominium in 
January, 1995, and said he was attempting to obtain financing. 
-.0. Lariy in liit i.icnth OL , ebruary oi 1^ J^ ni. Brody callea 
me once again and indicated to me that he had been unable to obtain 
financing to purchase the condominium. 
11. The Brodys have informed me that they listed our 
condominium for sale with Gary Larsen of Coldwell Banker in Ft. 
Union Plaza and that they have shown the home in open houses at 
least during the month of February of 1995. 
12. In February of 1995 I told Mr. Brody on the phone that he 
and his wife could stay in the condominium until March 15, 1995 and 
they paid rent up to and including that date. 
13. The Brodys continue to occupy our condominium and have 
only paid rent through March 15, 1995. 
14. The lease agreement has expired and we have been required 
to rent an apartment until our condominium is vacated and we can 
move home once again. 
Dated this /rf ~<3av of May, 199 
^ ^  ^ u ^ > • -fa-
Robert M. Mills 
Subscribed and sworn before me this \^ day of 
V-T^ -f , 1995. ^ 
My Commission Expires: NOTARY/PJEJfiKlC 
t6 ~ (^ TlSfek .cr^ri-. Residing it ^ i-l U (x C^ T 
V6\ (fb^jfi J?j J 1 ' ^u u , h s t n i e Strcot. •  :0>: ' j 
V ^ & i f w / ? ' / '^\ Lako Cily. Utah 0-: Hi « 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby verifies that on the V2- - day of May, 
1995, the foregoing Affidavit was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: Jana Jean Brody 
1593 East 6430 South 
Holladay, Utah 84121 
Matthew W. Driggs 
Armstrong, Rawlings & West 
1300 Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 ^ ^ / 
